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Abstract
I propose a model of learning centered on the idea that acquisition of skill is only
possible through personal interaction with an individual already possessing such skill.
In this environment, the fact that unskilled individuals learn from skilled individuals
increases the income of the latter, which increases the willingness of the unskilled to
acquire skill. The steady-state income of skilled individuals (teachers) is thus very sen-
sitive to the ability of unskilled individuals (students) to fund their education. Cross-
country differences in such ability have a multiplicative effect on the skill premium,
which becomes a cause of international migration of the skilled from less developed
countries (i.e. those with poorer access to educational credit) to more developed coun-
tries. Additionally, I study the welfare implications of such brain drain for a less
developed country. Although brain drain reduces the number of skilled individuals
in the country and thus makes acquisition of skill more difficult, unskilled individuals
may still be better off: the increased difficulty of skill acquisition is offset by a higher
skill premium once the skill has been acquired. Also, I find that increased openness of
less developed countries to migration and the resultant accelerated brain drain increase
the incentives for national governments to improve access of unskilled individuals to
education.
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1 Introduction
Despite the unprecedented development of long-distance communication technologies, knowl-
edge continues to diffuse from one person to another mainly by means of personal interaction.
One can become a scientist only through a continuous interaction with other scientists. In
stable political environments, virtually all successful politicians have an experience of inter-
action with politicians from previous cohorts. In most jobs, young workers learn from old
workers. Teaching services continue to be local in nature, and university professors in the
United States do not fear that their jobs will ever be exported to India. Even the acquisi-
tion of skills that are labeled by economists as “low” such as taxi driving, require frequent
personal interaction with people who have been in the business for some time. Numerous
studies find that the first destination of immigrant workers is usually a location where many
immigrants from the same country live,1 despite the fact that the new immigrants, whose
skills are usually similar to that of incumbent immigrants, would face less competition on
the job market in other locations.
Although there exists an extensive literature on the diffusion of knowledge2 and on posi-
tive externalities of human capital,3 virtually all of this literature assumes that all the welfare
gains of knowledge spillovers accrue only to those who absorb these spillovers; those who
generate them earn nothing beyond what they would earn in the absence of such spillovers.
But if diffusion of knowledge is local in nature, part of the welfare gain may be shifted
from the learners (young, unskilled workers) to the teachers (old, skilled workers) through
a bargaining process, pushing current earnings of the learners below their current marginal
product of labor, and vice versa, raising the income of the teachers. I define this phenomenon
as compensated knowledge spillovers. Park [1997] is, to my knowledge, the only account of
compensated knowledge spillovers in existing literature.4 The main focus of Park [1997] is to
study the effects of the fact that unskilled workers learn from the skilled on the age-earnings
profile, while the main focus of the current research is quite different and is elaborated below.
In this paper, I argue that a compensation for knowledge spillovers may have a multi-
plicative effect on the willingness to acquire skill and on the return to skill. When skilled
1E.g. Winters et al. [2001], Bauer et al. [2007], Munshi [2003]; Vergalli [2006] provides a theoretical
analysis of the location choice of migrants.
2Jovanovic and Rob [1989] is an example of theoretical analysis; Keller [2002] is an empirical account of
geographic localization; Keller [2004] contains a review of literature on knowledge spillovers.
3This literature starts with Lucas [1988]; applications of this concept to migration include Stark et al.
[1997], Mountford [1997], Stark and Wang [2002], and Stark and Zakharenko [2010].
4Although Park [1997] does not use the term “compensated knowledge spillovers” to define the phe-
nomenon.
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individuals increase their earnings by receiving a compensation for generating knowledge
spillovers, unskilled individuals have an increased willingness to acquire skill. Since the only
way for them to acquire skill is to learn from existing skilled individuals, the latter get a
further increase in earnings, further increasing the willingness of the unskilled to acquire
skill. This multiplicative positive effect of compensated knowledge spillovers on demand
for education offsets the traditional law of demand and makes the demand for education
highly inelastic. In the model that I develop, I show that own-price elasticity of demand for
education may approach zero under fairly mild restrictions on model parameters.
With highly inelastic demand, even small exogenous cross-country differences in the abil-
ity of the unskilled to acquire skills (for example, due to differences in their access to ed-
ucational credit) may lead to large differences in the return to skill and create a basis for
brain drain from a country with a poor access to educational credit (a country with “poor
institutions” henceforth). Thus, I identify a new potential cause of brain drain: while the ex-
isting literature explains international migration of skilled workers by the differences in how
much current output they can produce in different countries, I argue that brain drain may
arise even between countries with identical fundamental parameters (productivity of skilled
and unskilled, the learning technology), due to heterogeneous institutions that facilitate the
transfer of wealth from the unskilled to the skilled in compensation for knowledge spillovers.
Further, I study the welfare implications of reduced costs of migration between countries.
To obtain sharp results, I assume that countries differ only in one parameter – institutions
that govern the access of the unskilled individuals to credit – and study how increased open-
ness of a country with poorer institutions (less developed country) and a resulting accelerated
brain drain from that country to a country with better institutions (more developed coun-
try) affects the unskilled individuals left behind in the less developed country. On the one
hand, the departure of a fraction of skilled workers reduces the number of potential teachers
and makes it more difficult to acquire skill (the negative effect of openness). On the other
hand, increased country openness increases the return to skill, which makes unskilled indi-
viduals, who expect to acquire skill in the future better off (the positive effect of openness).
I find that when institutions in the less developed country are sufficiently good, the positive
welfare effect of openness overwhelms the negative effect, and the unskilled are better off:
openness brings a large increase in the return to skill and a small decrease in the number of
potential teachers. On the contrary, when home country institutions are sufficiently poor,
the opposite happens: openness sharply reduces the number of potential teachers and thus
makes it impossible for the unskilled individuals to acquire skill, making them worse off.
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Additionally, I study the welfare gains of the less developed country from a marginal
increase in the quality of institutions governing the access to credit. I find that such gain
is always higher in a more open country: the welfare of the unskilled is more sensitive to
the quality of institutions when the skilled have a better opportunity to leave. Thus, the
increased openness and the resultant increased brain drain help “discipline”a home country
government to improve institutions facilitating education. In the remainder of the paper, I
develop and analyze a model of skill acquisition and brain drain. I begin with a description
of a one-country (“closed economy”) steady-state, and then proceed to a two-country setting
to model migration between the two countries.
2 Closed Economy
2.1 Overview
This is a general equilibrium dynamic model. Time is discrete; at each moment of time τ ,
there is a continuum of a unitary mass of individuals that are endogenously divided into two
types – skilled and unskilled. I denote the fraction of skilled individuals in the economy in
period τ by mτ .
5 Between any two time periods, a randomly selected fraction 1 − δ of all
individuals dies. The same mass of new individuals is born; therefore, the total population
remains constant. Every newly-born individual is unskilled.
There is one consumption good, which is produced using the only input – skill – in
a manner specified below. The price of the good is normalized to unity. All individuals
maximize their discounted stream of consumption by:
Ui =
∑
τ=τi...∞
βτ−τici,τ (1)
where i is the index of an individual, τi is the birth date of individual i, τ is the index of
time, ci,τ ≥ 0 is consumption of individual i at time τ , and β < 1 is the discount factor.
Given that death is a random occurrence, individuals do not know the moment of their death
and calculate their utility on an infinite time horizon. I assumed that the death probability
is already built into the discount factor (thus β ≤ δ < 1), and therefore the parameter δ
does not explicitly enter the decision-making process. In each period of time, each skilled
5For convenience, I have denoted all exogenously given parameters and functions either by uppercase
Latin or lowercase Greek letters and all endogenous variables by lowercase Latin letters.
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individual produces two types of output: one unit of consumption good and one unit of
teaching services. Both outputs are supplied inelastically.
The productivity of unskilled individuals is normalized to zero.6 The only way for un-
skilled individuals (students) to become skilled is through personal interaction with existing
skilled individuals (teachers). The process of learning is stochastic and depends on the learn-
ing intensity of students x ≥ 0, which has two possible interpretations. First, it could be
viewed as a fraction of time a student has spent learning within each time period. Alter-
natively, we can assume that all students learn full time, but in classes of variable sizes:
low intensity x implies learning in a large class, while high intensity x implies learning in a
small class, or individually, or even individually with several teachers. In this stylized model
x must be equal to the ratio of teachers to students in equilibrium; empirically, x can be
measured as a ratio of skilled to unskilled people in the group of interest (country, firm etc.).
If an unskilled individual learns with intensity x, his probability of becoming skilled at
that point in time is P (x) where P : R+ → [0, 1] is a smooth, strictly increasing, and strictly
concave “learning” function.
The instantaneous income of individuals may differ from their instantaneous consump-
tion, which calls us to model savings decisions of an individual. To reduce dimensionality,
however, I avoid introducing an explicit model of savings, and make the following additional
assumptions. First, I assume that the savings rate is equal to the discount rate, which,
combined with the linear utility, makes individuals indifferent between current and future
consumption unless the non-negativity of consumption constraint binds or is expected to
bind in the future. Second, I assume that the borrowing rate is higher than the discount
rate, such that the net present cost of one borrowed dollar is K ≥ 1 dollars. The wedge
between the savings and the borrowing rate reflects the quality of financial institutions in
that country: K = 1 means that the quality of institutions is “perfect”, while a higher value
of K means the existence of transaction costs due to poor institutions. In an open economy
version of the model, the value of K will be the only exogenous difference across countries,
and one of our main parameters of interest.
2.2 Skilled individuals
Skilled individuals have reached their terminal state of knowledge, and supply both their
outputs, consumption good and teaching services, inelastically. As a result, there are no
6Generalizing the unskilled productivity to a positive value would reduce the incentive to acquire skill,
which would entail a lower return to skill, but it would not qualitatively change the results that follow.
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decisions that they have to make in a closed economy: each period of their remaining life,
they earn one unit of income from production, and wτ units of income from teaching, where
wτ is the compensation for knowledge spillovers generated by teachers, or “teachers’ com-
pensation”. Therefore, the value of being skilled at time τ0 is given by:
v1(wτ0 , wτ0+1, ...) =
∞∑
τ=τ0
βτ−τ0(1 + wτ )
In a steady state where the teachers’ compensation wτ is constant over time and is equal
to w, the above expression can be simplified to:
v1(w) =
1 + w
1− β (2)
2.3 Unskilled individuals and demand for education
Since the productivity of unskilled individuals is zero, there is no opportunity cost associated
with obtaining education, and low-skilled individuals spend all their time learning. I assume
that unskilled individuals do not have personal savings to fund their own education, and
thus have to borrow. An individual i who chooses a learning intensity xi,τ at time τ has to
borrow wτxi,τ dollars, the net present cost of which, as specified above, is equal to Kwτxi,τ .
Given the learning intensity xi,τ , the probability of becoming skilled is P (xi,τ ); therefore, the
value of being unskilled is:
vτ0 (wτ , wτ+1, ..., K) = max
z≥0
(−Kwτz + β [P (z)v1(wτ+1, wτ+2, ...) + (1− P (z))vτ+10 (wτ+1, wτ+2, ..., K)])
(3)
The steady-state version of (3) is:
v0(w,K) = max
z≥0
(−Kwτz + β [P (z)v1(w) + (1− P (z))v0(w,K)]) (4)
Using (2) and solving (4), we derive the (inverse) steady-state demand for education as:
w =
G(x(w,K))
K −G(x(w,K)) (5)
where x is the optimal steady-state learning intensity of the unskilled, and:
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G(x) ≡ P
′(x)
1−β
β
+ s(x)
(6)
s(x) ≡ P (x)− P ′(x)x (7)
Refer to the Appendix for proof.
From the properties of P (x), it follows that s(x) is increasing from zero to one, while
G(x) is decreasing from G(0) = β
1−βP
′(0) to zero.
Define by x(K) the lower bound of demand:
x(K) ≡ min
w
x(w,K) = x(∞, K)
The following property of the steady-state demand for education can now be established.
Proposition 1 (a) When institutions are sufficiently poor, K > G(0), demand for educa-
tion x(w,K) is positive when w < G(0)
K−G(0) , and is zero otherwise. Thus, x(K) = 0.
(b) When K = G(0), demand for education is positive for all w > 0, and approaches zero
as w approaches infinity. Thus, x(K) = 0 again.
(c) When K < G(0), demand for education is always positive and is bounded away from
zero: x(w,K) ≥ x(K) > 0, where x(K) satisfies the condition K = G(x(K)).
The proof follows directly from the formula for the inverse demand (5), and the fact that
G′(·) < 0.
This finding can be interpreted as follows. A marginal increase of the compensation w
has two effects. First, w can be seen as a tuition, and the law of demand prescribes unskilled
individuals to demand less of teaching services when tuition increases. Second, an increased
w means an increased return to skill (since education is provided by skilled individuals),
which means an increased willingness to acquire skill, implying an increased demand for
education. With poor institutions (high transaction costs K) the former effect overwhelms
the latter, and demand for education is a standard textbook demand function with negative
and bounded away from zero own-price elasticity. When transaction costs K are sufficiently
low, the two effects offset each other, and the learning intensity approaches its lower bound
x, while demand elasticity approaches zero, as the compensation w approaches infinity. The
two types of the demand curve for education are illustrated on figure 1.
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Figure 1: Demand for education: an illustration
2.4 Supply of teachers and equilibrium
We denote the steady-state fraction of skilled individuals in the economy by m; thus, the
teacher-student ratio, and the learning intensity of the unskilled in the closed economy is
x = m
1−m . The steady-state fraction of skilled people is determined by the fact that in every
period, the number of skilled that perish, (1 − δ)m, must be equal to the number of newly
produced skilled individuals, which in turn equals the number of the unskilled, 1−m, times
the probability that they acquire skill, P (x), times the probability that they survive until
the next period, δ:
(1− δ)m = δP (x)(1−m) (8)
P (x)
x
=
1− δ
δ
(9)
Formula (9) uniquely determines the steady-state supply of teaching services. Note that
due to our assumption of inelastic supply of teaching services, the equilibrium number of
teachers in the closed economy does not depend on the compensation w, and the supply is
therefore vertical.7
7One can develop a model in which skilled individuals have a tradeoff between production and teach-
ing, which would result in a traditional upward-sloping supply of teaching services. This would, however,
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Figure 2: An illustration of the steady-state
Next, we establish the existence of the closed economy steady state.
Proposition 2 In the closed economy, steady state exists and is unique.
Proof. The uniqueness follows from the fact that the steady-state supply of teaching services
is vertical, while the steady-state demand is downward sloping. To prove existence, given
that the amount of demanded educational services ranges from x(K) to infinity, it is sufficient
to show that the steady-state supply x is greater than the lower bound of demand x(K) for
any K. Indeed, when x(K) = 0, the proof is trivial since x > 0. Otherwise,
P ′(x(K)) >︸︷︷︸
cf.(7)
P ′(x(K))
1 + β
1+β
s(x(K))
=︸︷︷︸
cf.(6)
1− β
β
G(x(K))
=︸︷︷︸
definition of x
1− β
β
K ≥ 1− β
β
≥︸︷︷︸
β≤δ
1− δ
δ
=︸︷︷︸
cf.(9)
P (x)
x
≥ P ′(x)
The fact that P ′ is decreasing in its argument ensures x > x(K)
Figure 2 illustrates the steady state.
We can also calculate the effect of poorer institutions (higher K) on a closed-economy
GDP. As noted earlier, due to inelastic nature of the supply of teaching services, the share
complicate the analysis that follows, without adding new insights to the migration part of the model.
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of high-skilled individuals in the population, and thus the total amount of the consumption
good produced, does not depend on the quality of institutions. Nevertheless, inefficient
institutions lower social welfare as they result in a borrowing deadweight loss. In a more
general model with an upward-sloping supply of teaching services, inefficient institutions
would additionally cause a decline in the learning intensity, which would additionally result
in a smaller steady-state share of skilled individuals in the population, and thus even lower
GDP.
Proposition 3 With weaker institutions (higher K), steady-state country GDP decreases.
Proof.
The GDP of the country is the aggregate income of all individuals. Skilled individuals
earn 1 + w, while the unskilled pay Kwx = Kw m
1−m :
Y ≡ m(1 + w) + (1−m)(−Kwx) = m(1 + w)− (1−m)Kw m
1−m = m−m(K − 1)w
= m−m(K − 1) G(x)
K −G(x) (10)
From (8) and (9), it follows that the steady-state values of m and x do not change as the
quality of institutions K changes. Further, the fact that x > x(K) for any value of K
(cf. Proposition 2) ensures G(x) < G(x(1)) ≡ 1. Therefore, the value of GDP (10) strictly
diminishes from m to m(1−G(x)) as the value of K increases from unity to infinity. Thus,
weaker institutions, manifested in the form of a borrowing deadweight loss, reduce GDP
despite the fact that the amount of borrowing decreases with weaker institutions, and the
fact that the share of skilled individuals in the population does not change.
3 International migration
3.1 Brain drain
In this paper, I identify a new cause of the brain drain from less developed to more de-
veloped countries. I argue that even if the origin and destination countries have identical
“real-sector” parameters such as marginal product of labor of both skilled and unskilled
workers, fertility, life expectancy, and learning technology, brain drain may still exist due to
differences in the technology of transferring wealth from those who are willing to acquire skill
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to those who provide teaching services. Such differences, manifested in the form of costs of
transactions between teachers and students, lead to differences in return to skill across coun-
tries. Moreover, lower return to skill in a less developed country decreases the willingness
to acquire such skill, which leads to further decrease in return to skill. This multiplicative
effect of institutional differences creates an incentive for skilled individuals to migrate from
less developed to more developed countries. In this section, I conduct a formal analysis of
this effect and study its welfare implications.
Unlike the existing literature on international migration which explains migration pat-
terns by differences in productivities, or differences in exchange rates, or “psychic costs”
of living at home or abroad, this paper assumes that all these parameters are equal across
countries; the only difference among countries is the ease of borrowing for students. If stu-
dents have limited access to credit, they offer lower rewards to their teachers which makes
the latter emigrate; students’ access to education thus becomes limited.
Suppose there are two countries, North, whose quality of institutions is KN = 1, and
South, with KS ≡ K > 1. Thus, South is less developed, with higher costs of transactions.
Since the main focus of this paper is to study the effects of migration on the Southern
economy, we assume that North is a large country, so its steady-state does not depend on
international migration, and the Northern reward for teaching services is fixed at w = wN .
Southern autarky wage is lower, due to higher costs of transaction, and is equal to w = wAS .
I assume that there exist a fixed sunk costs of emigration of M ; free arbitrage condition
imposes the following restriction on the Southern reward for teaching services:89
w = max{wAS , wN − (1− β)M} (11)
where (1−β)M is the annuity value of the migration cost M . I assume that M is sufficiently
low, so that w = wN − (1− β)M > wAS .
I assume that only skilled individuals can migrate; this is consistent with the selective
immigration policy exercised by most developed recipient countries. I also assume that the
number of individuals born each period in the South, and thus the total number of Southern-
born individuals, is constant and does not depend on migration flows. With exogenous
8All endogenous variables without subscripts refer to the Southern economy henceforth, unless otherwise
specified.
9One important phenomenon not captured in this paper is that limited access to credit negatively affects
not only the acquisition of skill, but also the ability of individuals to migrate. In this paper, the cost of
migration M is assumed to be independent of institutions K: skilled individuals that consider migration are
assumed to have enough funds for such migration.
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inflow of newly-born into the Southern economy, definition and calculation of the steady
state becomes straightforward even when there is an endogenous outflow of migrants from
the economy.
With the above assumptions, the following properties of an open Southern economy can
be established. The fraction of skilled Southerners that migrate to the North is denoted by
r.
Proposition 4 The lowered migration cost M and associated increased Southern return to
skill w have the following steady-state effects on the Southern economy:
(a) reduced learning intensity of the unskilled, x;
(b) reduced total (at home and abroad) number of skilled Southerners, m;
(c) increased r, the fraction of skilled Southerners that live abroad.
Proof. Since the learning decisions of the Southern unskilled are described by the (inverse)
downward-sloping demand function (5), the proof of (a) is straightforward: higher tuition w
results in a lower demanded learning intensity x.
The proof of (b) follows from (8) that equates the number of newly created skilled indi-
viduals with the number of skilled that perish, whether at home or abroad. The increased
openness of the South and the associated lower x must lead to a reduction of m.
The proof of (c) follows from the fact that the equilibrium learning intensity must equal
the ratio of skilled Southerners that remain at home to the unskilled Southerners: x = (1−r)m
1−m .
Upon combining this expression with (8), we obtain
1− δ
δ
=
P (x)
x
(1− r) (12)
Concavity of P (·) implies that d
dx
P (x)
x
< 0; using this fact and the implicit function theorem,
we obtain from (12) that dr
dx
< 0. Therefore, increased openness, by reducing x, increases
the emigration rate r.
Figure 3 illustrates the steady state with emigration.
3.2 Welfare effects of brain drain
The main focus of this paper is to study the welfare implications of the brain drain. To fix
ideas, I assume by “welfare” the expected utility of newly-born individuals. In other words,
12
Figure 3: Steady-state with brain drain
does emigration of the skilled individuals make, on average, happier those Southerners who
have just entered this world? Since all newly-born are unskilled, it is sufficient to study the
effects of the brain drain on the value of being unskilled, v0(w,K). Prior to the analysis, it
is helpful to introduce the following short form of v0:
Lemma 1
v0(w,K) =
w + 1
1− β S(x(w,K)) (13)
S(x) ≡ s(x)
1−β
β
+ s(x)
(14)
The proof is contained in Appendix.
The main result can now be established.
Proposition 5 When institutions are sufficiently poor, K ≥ β
1−βP
′(0), the increasing open-
ness of the South and the resultant increase in the compensation for knowledge spillovers w
reduce welfare: dv0(w,K)
dw
< 0. Otherwise, the welfare effect of openness is non-monotone: it
is negative when the initial compensation w is below a threshold, and is positive otherwise.
Intuitively, there are two opposite effects of increased openness and the resulting increase
of w on the welfare. First, the negative effect is that a higher compensation for knowledge
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spillovers w means that the unskilled have to pay more for education, and therefore have
a lower chance of skill acquisition. Second, the positive effect is that a higher w means a
higher return to skill and therefore higher welfare once the skill has been acquired. With
sufficiently good institutions and sufficiently high initial w, the own-price elasticity of demand
for education is close to zero, hence a further increase in w does not lead to a significant
reduction of the learning intensity x. Thus, the probability that the unskilled acquire skill is
not significantly reduced and the first (negative) effect on welfare is small, while the second
(positive) effect is still large.
Proof. Using (13), we have that
(1− β)dv0
dw
= S(x) + (w + 1)
dS(x)
dx
(
dw
dx
)−1
=︸︷︷︸
cf.(5)
S(x) +
K
K −G(x)
dS(x)
dx
(K −G(x))2
K
(
dG(x)
dx
)−1
= S(x) + (K −G(x))dS(x)
dx
(
dG(x)
dx
)−1
(15)
The Appendix proves that (15) is equal to
(1− β)dv0
dw
=
P (x)− 1−β
β
Kx(
1−β
β
+ P (x)
)
which is positive if and only if
β
1− β
P (x)
x
≥ K (16)
Define x∗(K) as the value of the learning intensity that equates (16): β
1−β
P (x∗(K))
x∗(K) ≡ K. Since
P (x)
x
is decreasing, dv0
dw
is positive when the equilibrium learning intensity is sufficiently small:
x(w) ≤ x∗, that is, the return to skill w is sufficiently large; dv0
dw
is negative otherwise. Note
that since 1−β
β
P (x∗(K))
x∗(K) <
1−β
β
limz→0
P (z)
z
= 1−β
β
P ′(0), x∗(K) exists only when institutions are
sufficiently good, K < β
1−βP
′(0). Otherwise, dv0
dw
is negative for all values of w.
To complete the proof, we need to verify that the value of x∗(K) is meaningful, that is,
it exceeds the lower bound of the learning intensity x(K). Indeed,
β
1− βP
′(x∗(K)) <
β
1− β
P (x∗(K))
x∗(K)
≡ K ≡ G(x(K)) ≡ P
′(x(K))
1−β
β
+ s(x(K))
<
β
1− βP
′(x(K))
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By assumption, P ′(x) is strictly decreasing in x, which ensures x∗(K) > x(K).
3.3 Improvement of institutions
It is intuitively obvious and straightforward to verify that better institutions would lead to
increased welfare. Improvement of institutions, however, usually comes at a social cost, and
it is therefore useful to know by how much better institutions increase welfare, and whether
greater openness of a country to migration increases or decreases the social gain from better
institutions. The following proposition states that greater openness increases this gain: in
more open countries, governments have a higher incentive to make their institutions better.
Proposition 6 Greater openness of a country to migration and resulting increased compen-
sation for knowledge spillovers, w, lead to a higher marginal gain from better institutions:
d
dw
∣∣∣∣dv0(w,K)dK
∣∣∣∣ = − d2v0dwdK > 0
Proof. d
2v0
dwdK
= d
dK
dv0
dw
can be obtained by differentiating (15) with respect to K. We get:
d
dK
(
S(x(w,K)) + (K −G(x(w,K)))dS(x(w,K))
dx
(
dG(x(w,K))
dx
)−1)
= (K −G(x)) d
dx
(
dS(x)
dx
(
dG(x)
dx
)−1)
dx
dK
+
dS(x)
dx
(
dG(x)
dx
)−1
(17)
To prove that (17) is negative, it is sufficient to show that each of its two components is
negative. Indeed, in the first component that consists of three multipliers, two multipliers
are positive while the third is negative:
K −G(x) > 0
d
dx
(
dS(x)
dx
(
dG(x)
dx
)−1)
=
d
dx
(
1−β
β
x
1−β
β
+ P (x)
)
=
(
1− β
β
) 1−β
β
+ P (x)− P ′(x)x(
1−β
β
+ P (x)
)2 > 0
We can compute dx
dK
from (5), using the implicit function theorem and holding w fixed:
dx
dK
= G(x)
K
(
dG(x)
dx
)−1
< 0 due to dG(x)
dx
< 0.
The second component of (17) is also negative because dS(x)
dx
> 0 while dG(x)
dx
< 0.
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Figure 4: Welfare isolines of newly born, as functions of institutions and compensation for
knowledge spillovers
Figure 4 plots the welfare isolines of the newly born, as functions of institutions (transac-
tion costs) and compensation for knowledge spillovers. The highest welfare is attained in the
NorthWest corner of the graph, with the lowest transaction costs (best institutions) and the
highest compensation for knowledge spillovers. The lowest welfare (that is, zero) is attained
in the NorthEast corner, with the highest transaction costs and the highest compensation.
This means that, with high cost of education and high borrowing constraints, education
is virtually unattainable, and hence there is no skill production in the economy. Without
skilled individuals, there is no one from which unskilled individuals could learn from; even
if skilled individuals did exogenously appear, they would all immediately emigrate.
With poor institutions/high transaction costs, a rise in the compensation w is decreasing
welfare, while for low transaction costs, such a rise first decreases and then increases welfare,
as predicted by Proposition 5. Also, the horizontal distance between isowelfare curves di-
minishes as the compensation for knowledge spillovers rises, which illustrates Proposition 6:
with higher compensation due to greater openness, an equivalent improvement in institutions
leads to a greater welfare gain (more isowelfare lines are crossed).
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4 Conclusion
Modern civilization is only possible because people acquire knowledge from those who already
possess the knowledge rather than acquiring it by themselves. While this phenomenon is well-
studied at both theoretical and empirical levels, its logical extension that knowledge spillovers
from skilled to unskilled may be compensated by the latter, and that this compensation
may positively affect the willingness to acquire skill, is not discussed in the literature. In
the present paper, I elaborate on this idea by developing a general equilibrium model of
skill acquisition, in which the unskilled individuals acquire skill only by interacting with the
skilled, and by compensating the latter for knowledge spillovers they generate. An exogenous
increase in the demand for education, for example, due to lower costs of transaction between
learners and teachers, has a multiplicative effect: it leads to an increase in the return to
skill, which encourages the unskilled to acquire even more skill and boosts the demand for
education even further.
I apply this idea to a model of international migration between countries with exogenously
different ability of the unskilled to pay for their education, which leads to large differences
in the return to skill and creates a basis for skilled migration from a less developed country
to a more developed country. I find that an increased openness of the less developed country
to such emigration may lead to an increase of welfare of the unskilled, despite the fact that
they lose potential teachers, when institutions in the less developed country are sufficiently
good. I also find that such increased openness increases economic payoffs to improvement of
institutions.
The framework developed in this paper can also be applied to model another important
phenomenon – return migration. Theoretical literature on human capital acquisition and
return migration is scarce; to my knowledge, the only two theories are Santos and Postel-
Vinay [2003] and Mayr and Peri [2008]. Both of these are based on a conventional model
of migration in which accumulation of knowledge depends only on the effort of the learn-
ers, and migration is induced by differences in productivity of the consumption good(s) in
different countries. To explain why an individual first migrates to a more developed coun-
try, and then returns back, both of these models introduce an ad hoc assumption of a skill
premium of returnees: people who have lived abroad and returned become more productive
than others. The skill premium is applied only to returnees; it does not apply to those
who never emigrated, or those who emigrated but not returned. Within the framework of
the current paper, return migration can be explained without such an artificial assumption:
return migration emerges when financial institutions at home suddenly improve. With bet-
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ter institutions, unskilled Southerners can borrow (and thus study) more, which creates a
temporary deficit of skill in the South. Such a deficit makes Southern emigrants return if
the cost of doing so is sufficiently low.
Appendix
Derivation of demand for education Maximization of (4) with respect to learning
intensity z results in the following first-order condition:
−Kw + βP ′(x(w,K))(v1(w)− v0(w,K)) ≤ 0 (18)
where x(w,K) is the arg max of (4). Note that (18) holds with strict equality if x(w,K) > 0.
Solving for v1 − v0, we get
(v1(w)− v0(w,K)) ≤ Kw
βP ′(x(w,K))
(19)
Substituting the inequality for v1 − v0 back into (4) yields, after some rearrangement,
(1− β)v0(w,K) ≤ −Kwx(w,K) +Kw P (x(w,K))
P ′(x(w,K))
Given that (cf.(2)) v0(w,K) = v1(w)− (v1(w)− v0(w,K)) ≥ 1+w1−β − KwβP ′(x(w,K)) , we have that
(1 + w)−Kw 1− β
βP ′(x(w,K))
≤ (1− β)v0(w,K) ≤ Kw
(
P (x(w,K))
P ′(x(w,K))
− x(w,K)
)
Rearranging, we get
1 + w
Kw
≥ P (x(w,K))
P ′(x(w,K))
− z + 1− β
β
1
P ′(x(w,K))
=
1−β
β
+ P (x(w,K))− P ′(x(w,K))x(w,K)
P ′(x(w,K))
=
1
G(x(w,K))
where G is defined in (6). Solving for w, we get (5).
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Proof of Lemma 1 From (18), we have that
v0(w, x) = v1(w)− Kw
βP ′(x)
(20)
From (2), we know that v1(w) =
1+w
1−β . From (5), we have that Kw = (w+ 1)
P ′(x)
1−β
β
+P (x)−P ′(x)x ,
which allows us to rewrite (20) as follows:
v0(w, x) = (w + 1)
[
1
1− β −
1
(1− β) + β(P (x)− P ′(x)x)
]
= (w + 1)
1
1− β
β(P (x)− P ′(x)x)
(1− β) + β(P (x)− P ′(x)x)
= v1(w)
P (x)− P ′(x)x
1−β
β
+ P (x)− P ′(x)x
= v1(w)
s(x)
1−β
β
+ s(x)
Proof of Proposition 5 continued
S(x) + (K −G(x))dS(x)
dx
(
dG(x)
dx
)−1
=︸︷︷︸
cf.(6),(7),(14)
s(x)
1−β
β
+ s(x)
+
(
K − P
′(x)
1−β
β
+ s(x)
)
1−β
β
x
1−β
β
+ P (x)
=
(
1−β
β
+ P (x)
)
(P (x)− P ′(x)x)−
(
K 1−β
β
+Ks(x)− P ′(x)
)
1−β
β
x(
1−β
β
+ s(x)
)(
1−β
β
+ P (x)
)
=
P
(
1−β
β
+ P (x)− P ′(x)x
)
− 1−β
β
Kx
(
1−β
β
+ P (x)− P ′(x)x
)
(
1−β
β
+ s(x)
)(
1−β
β
+ P (x)
)
=
P (x)− 1−β
β
Kx(
1−β
β
+ P (x)
)
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